BBG Shortwave: Sorting the Fact From the Fiction
Once the only tool, shortwave is now just one of many in the distribution toolbox. But when, where, and how much the BBG should use SW has become a hot topic…
The BBG's Greenville, North Carolina transmitting station.
Shortwave. It’s among the most hotly debated topics inside and outside the BBG. Once the single go-to method of distribution, the medium is now just one of many tools employed by BBG broadcasters.
The debate on the funding and promise of shortwave merits careful research and analysis as well as accurate data. Readers of online commentary may struggle to sort fact from fiction, so here’s a breakdown of recent arguments.
The Argument: The BBG Wants to Eliminate Not Just Shortwave, but Eliminate All Radio
The Facts: This is fiction. More than 30 million people each week listen to BBG broadcasters on shortwave, and more than 100 million on all radio combined. Neither the strategic plan nor the budget calls for eliminating shortwave radio, medium wave (AM) radio, or FM radio.
What the BBG aims to do is use the appropriate distribution method for the market. We’ve used the term “platform agnostic.” In other words, we’ll use whatever works. Keep in mind that Radio Free Europe once famously used weather balloons to drop leaflets over Prague.
Shortwave use is down drastically worldwide, but still viable in a handful of countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Burma. In those places, we will continue to use it. In places such as China, with scant use of shortwave and regular, effective jamming of our broadcasts, the BBG recommended a decrease, but not elimination of, shortwave to redirect funds that favor a mix of delivery options that includes satellite radio and TV, and new media.
In China, multiple research studies show that all weekly radio listening stands at about 8%. Shortwave listening stands at less than a half of 1%. FM is at 7%; medium wave (AM) less.
The BBG continues to use shortwave where it is viable. It will also use shortwave as a medium of last resort to target audiences in closed societies such as North Korea.
Worth noting is that the BBG is not alone in its assessment of shortwave. Other international broadcasters such as the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Radio France International, and Radio Canada International have arrived at similar conclusions and are employing similar approaches. Given the strong trend away from shortwave usage, international broadcasters need to deliver content on the mediums that target audiences use, whether they be traditional radio or television, or emerging new media and digital platforms.
A portion of the BBG's Greenville, North Carolina shortwave antenna array.
The Argument: If There is No Future in Shortwave, Why is China So Interested?
The Facts: Yes, China does appear interested in shortwave – with two different motives. First, China State Radio has set up a network of shortwave transmitters nationwide – on the exact frequency that the BBG uses to try to reach the Chinese population.
With radio and shortwave use so low in China, one can surmise that the network exists primarily to jam outsiders, which they do with great effect.
Second, China has stated that it wants to be a worldwide player in media, investing a reported $6-$7 billion to do so. If those numbers are correct, China has the financial resources to tolerate fractional returns on its investment.
The Argument: Shortwave Cannot Be Jammed, But Satellite Can Be Jammed and the Internet Can Be Blocked
The Facts: This is fiction. The overwhelming majority of our shortwave transmissions to China are indeed routinely jammed. While it is possible, and even likely, that some individuals in remote rural locations might be able to listen to our broadcasts, the reality is that in most cases, the signals, as far as the vast majority of the Chinese population are concerned, are either inaudible or replaced by Chinese government broadcasts. BBG monitoring of these broadcasts confirm this, and samples are available here.
Governments that want to control what their citizens can hear or see can block or jam any medium if they have the resources to do so. The BBG is not naïve about the difficulties it faces in reaching citizens in China or other closed societies. It does believe, however, that it should us all tools at its disposal.
Satellite jamming, for example, is so far a practice only of rogue states. China is yet to take that step.
In China, there are more than 100 million satellite dishes. With that information, the BBG has created a satellite delivered audio stream augmented with still pictures. It is delivering a crystal clear signal into China at a cost of about $250,000 a year. Shortwave transmissions to China currently cost the BBG $7 million annually.
Further, VOA plans to expand satellite television programming to China in an effort to reach its citizens.
The Argument: At Any Given Moment, There Are One Billion Shortwave Receivers Turned On Worldwide
The Facts: This statistic, attributed to the International Broadcasting Bureau, was posted on the website of World Christian Broadcasting in a post called “Why Shortwave?”
The post was used to criticize BBG strategy. After all, why would the BBG recommend sun-setting of some shortwave when its own data pointed to wide use?
The IBB was very surprised by the attribution and could not find any study that supported the data point.
When contacted by the BBG, World Christian Broadcasting president Charles H. Caudill said that the post had been on the site “for some time,” and the organization could not verify where the ‘one billion’ data had come from.
World Christian Broadcasting has since removed the data point and its attribution to the IBB, as well as another data point that claimed 60 million shortwave radios in the Western Hemisphere, from its website.
The Argument: IBB’s Greenville, North Carolina Shortwave Transmitting Station Should Be Used to Serve Egypt
The Facts: Possible, but not an optimal use of BBG assets.
Cairo is 9580 kilometers from Greenville, requiring three or four hops off the ionosphere to get a signal into the city. Meanwhile, we have a state-of-the-art steerable antenna in Kuwait that is 1616 kilometers from Cairo.
Comparing the two, it would take 35 times more power to reach Cairo from Greenville than from Kuwait. The BBG’s variable cost for the Cairo transmission would be $6 per hour, but $31 from Greenville. Shortwave from Greenville would result in an inferior signal at a higher price.
The primary question regarding Egypt is whether the BBG should use shortwave at all to target a market dominated by satellite television.
2010 data showed about 5% of the population used shortwave on a weekly basis. In cities like Cairo, with a plethora of media options, that percentage would slide even lower.
The BBG reaches Egypt via Alhurra, a 24/7 satellite television channel, and Radio Sawa on medium wave (AM). 2010 data shows that 76% of Egyptians own a satellite dish and 32% use medium wave (AM) weekly.
In Conclusion
The Facts: Radio – including shortwave – remains a viable tool for BBG broadcasters. The decision to use shortwave will be driven by target audience habits, market forces, and available transmission opportunities in each individual market.
Category: China, Tibet and Uyghur, Distribution, Strategic Review, Think Pieces
First off 31.00 per hour to run Greenville versus 6.00 for Kuwait. Im not sure who came up with that but you better look at your numbers. Also on Greenville versus Kuwait I agree that Kuwait is going to have a stronger signal into Egypt. 35 times more power? Really?
They are closer by a few thousand miles. However Greenville was designed to get a signal into there, a good signal and still can. The propagation studies dont lie.
If you for a moment think your going to be in Kuwait forever you better think again. Stability in the middle east is at best a temporary thing. On Chinese jamming, if it so effective why is the station on the Mariana Islands still even on the air. Isnt that a giant waste of money in fuel if no one can hear it anyway? I cant belieive that you guys havent killed that station and spent the money on more servers. Im really suprised. Wouldnt that money be better spent on a web siite that someone may spend thirty seconds on before going to wikipedia?
The issues we have today are not only getting our message to the Middle East but South and Central America. I dont know if anyone has noticed but South America is becoming a mess and we arent sending much of anything down there. Sounds like there is a leadership problem up there thats not identifying the trouble spots and directing information to those areas. Greenville is the ideal tool for keeping that mission (South and Central America)going,and it needs to keep going. You make a point about Kuwait over Greenville to Egypt but Kuwait has no where near the signal that Greenville has to South America. Run the propagation studies I have. The internet is very easy to defeat. As we all know Mr. Obama wants an internet kill switch. Dont you think other governements dont already have such a thing in place? Do you think for a moment that your going to get your programming through if an unfriendly government doesnt want you to?
Does the guy out in the bushes have a wifi card and a computer? Probably not. He does have a radio Ill bet. Shortwave is still a viable medium. If you folks would start using DRM like the Aussies and many other do ( Russia India and the Vatican sure see the value in it) and of course put out a product worth listeining to then Im sure getting more listeners isnt a problem. Shortwave isnt dead, your trying to murder it. The engineering arguments you make a poor and are probably being made by folks with the internet as their agenda. If thats the case then the war is over before its fought. I think that we need real broadcasters running the bbg not IT people
Thanks for the comments and ideas, Glenn.
Just a clarification: The focus on the Greenville shortwave transmission facility was intended to solely address criticism that the BBG was not using it to reach Egypt. As noted, the country is not really a strong candidate for shortwave considering the audience preference for other media, plus our other strong assets (satellite television, medium wave) that target Egypt.
It was not intended to otherwise disparage the other strengths that Greenville brings to the table for U.S. international broadcasting.
Regarding the relative costs of transmission from Kuwait versus Greenville:
These are the actual variable costs from the FY11 budget. Those numbers are accurate.
Regarding the relative power requirements of Kuwait vs. Greenville for transmitting shortwave into Cairo:
Power density decreases as the square of the distance from the transmitter source. This is simple physics. Disregarding multiple hops and any other forms of additional loss, doubling the distance between a transmitter and receiver requires a four times increase in transmitter power, a 6 dB increase, to maintain the same signal strength at the receiver. The distance from Greenville to Cairo is about 9580 km. The distance from Kuwait to Cairo is approximately 1616 km. Greenville is 5.9 times farther from Cairo than Kuwait. This means that the effective radiated power (transmitter power times antenna gain) must be 15.4 dB higher, calculated by 20*log(9580/1616), minimum, than that from Kuwait to produce the same signal in Cairo. Converting a power ratio of 15.4 dB to a straight power multiplier results in 34.7.
As a result, 34.7 times the power is required from Greenville just to overcome the additional free space path loss over that from Kuwait and have an equivalent signal. This is not saying that a signal from Greenville cannot be heard in Cairo, but we require a broadcast quality signal and Kuwait can much more easily supply that. Additionally, the path from Greenville to Cairo is typically a three hop, and sometimes four hop, path. Each hop incurs additional loss over the free space loss discussed above, so the analysis above is best case. The path from Kuwait to Cairo is a one hop path.
The rotatable antenna in Kuwait would be the antenna of choice for serving Cairo. This antenna is a 2/2/0.5 rotatable curtain array. This antenna does have less gain than any antenna that would be used at Greenville but likely not less than half that of a Greenville antenna, which does not even come close to making up the difference in radiated power required. A brief analysis using 250 kW at each station and an antenna twice as big from Greenville, an HRS 4/4/0.5, as from Kuwait shows that the maximum signal in Cairo from Kuwait was 25 dB stronger, almost 10 dB more than in the “best case” analysis above, than the maximum signal from Greenville and was available for longer periods each day. On a typical receiver, 25 dB would show up on a signal strength meter as about 4 “S units” higher, assuming 6 dB per “S unit”.
- Andre Mendes, BBG Director, Office of Technology, Services and Innovation
Dear BBG Strategy,
I am an employee at VOA & a few months ago I subscribed to the Strategy RSS feed. I really appreciate the Strategy information that I receive via the RSS feed, especially since you use facts and figures to illustrate your points. Please keep writing such pieces as they really do help me, (or us employees) understand the complex and ever changing nature of international broadcasting. Finally, I have one suggestion. When you publish one of your pieces, could a link to it be included in the IBB email announcements that go out 2x a day? My thinking is that your pieces will then, perhaps, reach a wider internal audience. Cordially, Nancy
Thanks Nancy, and good idea regarding internal house announcements. Will pursue.
Lei el artìculo -por demás interesante – en el enlace indicado y me pregunto: no será que detrás de todo esto hay una “Agenda Oculta” y los grandes monstruos de la radiodifusion internacional tienen pensado cerrar sus emisiones en ondas cortas, para regresar con otra tecnología de transmision ? Sera el sistema DRM…? . Esa idea – quizás descabellada – no se me quita de la cabeza!. Estaré errado ?. El tiempo lo dira !!!
Only just discovered this post even though it’s been here for a while. I like the style and the clear reasoning. I would also add from my experience in shortwave international broadcasting that the use of Kuwait as opposed to Greenville is more than just a power argument. Long West to East paths are less reliable at dawn and dusk in Egypt and, in my experience, are prone to awful fading distortion. SWL’s got used to is when there was nothing else. But now, I agree, that SW is the medium of last resort. Bearing in mind the importance of satellite television in that area, audiences have turned away from shortwave in large numbers. It makes more sense for BBG to use any relevant platforms to share its programmes with audiences. Keeping alive some services just in case of political changes seems to be an expensive waste of funds, especially with oil at 92 dollars a barrel. I believe VOA has access to extensive facilities at Wooferton in UK and elsewhere should sites in the Middle East become unavailable.
The window for AM DRM has closed. Not because it doesn’t work but because the stand-alone receivers are never going to reach the numbers that make a switch to digital sensible. I was involved in the early days of DRM tests (1996) when the dream was to replace crackly shortwave with a sound approaching FM mono. 15 years later it has become obvious that because the technology does integrate easily into mobile phones (you’d need an external antenna or something poking out of the case), that everything points to DRM as being a solution looking for a problem. We need to close the books and move on. I get the impression that other parts of the US government have long since taken alternatives routes.
[...] to the BBG, which is responsible for America’s overseas broadcasting, shortwave still remains a viable format in some developing countries, albeit with [...]